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Europe and the Mediterranean Sphere – a shared Heritage? 
Transcultural and intercultural Heritage in the  
Euro-Mediterranean Sphere. 
By Verena Metze-Mangold 
 “I speak to you, my heart - So you may answer me.”1 
What this is about 
With her simple statement that there is knowledge that does not connect but 
instead separates, Bénédicte Savoy succinctly describes what is at the core of 
political strife today.  
It is the renewed fears of a "finis germaniae", "finis europae" that paralyse us. 
We forget what power lies in encountering each other as strangers. Richard Sen-
nett wonderfully described it in “The Fall of Public Man". He reminds us how 
greatly this trait enriched European culture and fed into the rise and dominance 
of Europe. And, as if it required further proof, Joshua Cohen writes at the be-
ginning of the European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018 with the motto ‘Sharing 
Heritage’: "Toledo in transit. The translation of this into the real world can be 
witnessed in the example of the Spanish city, which in the Middle Ages ensured 
that divergent cultures inspired each other. No modern Europe without this her-
itage.”2 
“It was as unheroic heroes that, in the spring of 1085, the armies of Alfonso VI 
of Castile rode into the city that we call Toledo, deposed the Umayyad Dynasty, 
and brought to a close nearly three centuries of Moorish Muslim rule, in a cam-
paign that the Castilian Spanish language, but not the Arabic language, refers to 
as Reconquista. The new Christian reconquerors found that this city called To-
ledo (which was also a Kingdom, and, in Arabic, a Taifa of al-Andalus) pos-
sessed a mixed population, which spoke, read, and wrote a mongrelity of 
                                                          
1 A quote from a poem by the Egyptian Khakheperreseneb from around 1800 BC, titled “About Things in 
the Country”, translated from Jan Assmann’s German translation which was displayed at the award of the 
German Book Trade Peace Prize in 2018. 
2 Joshua Cohen, Toledo in Transit. FAZ, 10 February 2018, S. 12 
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tongues: Arabic, Hebrew, Ladino, Latin, and lingua Tholetana, the local Ro-
mance vernacular. 
Concomitantly, the city’s Muslim religious institutions possessed large libraries 
with a polyglot of books that had, perhaps, only a single commonality: they 
were largely incomprehensible to their new owners. In order to take fuller pos-
session of what they’d fought for, then, a movement came about to translate 
these works and make them legible. This movement, which in the imagination 
of history has acquired the moniker the Toledo School—as if its impulse imme-
diately sterilized itself with campuses and deans—succeeded in bringing an un-
precedented amount of the scientific and mathematical and philosophical 
thought of the Arab world, and of the scientific and mathematical and philo-
sophical thought that the Arab world had itself translated from the Greek, into 
“modern” Castilian Spanish and so into “modern” Europe.  
Because it is a fact that while the Romans copied Greek statuary and painting—
Greek surfaces—it was only the Arabs, and, to a degree, the Persians, who took 
it upon themselves to preserve the less superficial appurtenances: Greek thought 
and literary culture. 
No modern Europe without this heritage indeed. But is the perception of modern 
Europeans truly shaped by this memory?  
The concept of shared heritage, the motto of the European Year of Cultural Her-
itage, is certainly interesting for this search for traces of our European percep-
tion and imagination. However, this hinges on the premise that the memory of 
Europe and the Mediterranean sphere has not been completely overlaid by im-
ages of migrants, or their corpses, arriving on European beaches. We require 
multi-dimensional imagery and imagination that encourages the richness of cul-
tures and maintains respect for and curiosity about difference. “Diplomacy is 
about perception,” Kissinger once said. The insight that it is our chosen per-
spective that determines our perception has been consolidated in the social sci-
ences with the term ‘framing’. The search for traces begins with our own per-
ception.  
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Crisis of the global order  
The European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018 sets high demands for itself: we 
wanted to emphasise the cultural foundation of the European peace project and 
thus give new impetus to the peace project of the European unification process.  
If we realise in what moment of world history this is taking place, one cannot 
help but beat the crisis drum. 
The most powerful Western democracy is serious about its proclamation to pur-
sue its national interests primarily and unilaterally. The US is reneging on the 
Iran Treaty. The withdrawal from various trade agreements and the Paris Cli-
mate Accord tends in the same direction. From the east, China is introducing 
‘social scoring’ and rolling out the Silk Road.  
This development threatens to significantly alter the global order of the last dec-
ades. One might ask how realistic this nationally-focused approach truly is 
given the global interdependence in times of climate change, terror, global ref-
ugee and migration movements, financial crises, cultural eradication, cyber-
crime, artificial intelligence and synthetic biology. Understanding among na-
tions and coordinated international standard-setting are more necessary today 
than they ever were. And yet progress is being rolled back everywhere. 
It is no coincidence that historians draw parallels between 1918 and 2018. The 
mid- to long-term political and economic costs of an ultimately imperialist uni-
lateralism, based on the unrestrained exploitation of asymmetrical power rela-
tions and regional dependencies, are uncertain at best.  
This political strategy exposes itself to incalculable risks. But it also has reper-
cussions on the concept of the West, on the concept of Europe, on the European 
Union, its Member States and external relations. Germany, the belated nation, 
arrived in the West late in the game; but when she arrived, the West disappeared, 
the Indian intellectual Pankaj Mishra stated derisively in Berlin. 
What can such an official year – European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018 – 
contribute to a Europe that is struggling for its very existence as a community of 
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values? Or rather: what can we achieve with this European Year of Cultural 
Heritage 2018?  
European Architectural Heritage Year 1975 
In its genesis, the European Year of Cultural Heritage pays homage to the ultra-
successful European Architectural Heritage Year, which the Council of Europe 
proclaimed in 1975 and which is today regarded as the start of the disputes sur-
rounding architectural heritage in West Germany. What is surprising is that the 
scientific standards for the preservation of cultural heritage that had already 
been developed around the turn of the twentieth century were now activated 
politically against the eradication frenzy surrounding historical monuments.  
A newly formulated understanding of history was the result and it altered the 
public’s view of elements of industrial culture and Alltagsgeschichte (history of 
everyday life) and towards the buildings of the 19th and 20th centuries. A ho-
listic view of the urban landscape prevailed (Ulrike Wendland). Architectural 
conservation laws were enacted in the federal states. 
Architectural heritage bodies were restructured and strengthened in terms of 
personnel and funding. Monument preservation had become an interdisciplinary 
professional field. Historians, building researchers, folklorists, scientists, ar-
chaeologists, restorers, planners, architects and craftsmen worked together. 
Monument preservation departed its elitist island and opened up to society, cit-
izens’ initiatives, politics and urban planning. An entirely new perspective 
emerged. 
Even if we inquire into the potential political impact of civil society forces, the 
1975 European Architectural Heritage Year is a remarkable event in terms of 
today's analysis. A massive developmental wave was corrected thanks to the 
marshalling of innumerable forces. Without this correction, our urban land-
scapes would look very different today. 
European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018 
Today we face a completely different picture with the European Year of Cul-
tural Heritage. It is about more than a specialist topic such as the preservation 
   Europa Bottom-Up Nr. 22 
 
   9 
of monuments, even if one must concede that the issue of monument preserva-
tion in 1975 in West Germany radiated deep into the political and cultural reality 
of the cities and the Republic. Today, we speak of culture in a much wider, even 
existential sense.  
We see cracks and considerable static risks in the structures of the European 
integration project. Following the shocking financial and economic crisis of late 
2007 and the crisis of recent years caused by massive refugee and migration 
movements, the European area is being subjected to great political and cultural 
stress. 
The United Kingdom held a referendum, in which its population determined it 
no longer wanted part in this European integration project. Globally, the free-
democratic social and political model that Europe in particular represents is be-
ing challenged by a new authoritarianism that has emerged as the more effective 
form of governance in the 21st century.  
Anyone who carefully followed the speeches of the French President and the 
German Chancellor in Davos in 2018 heard, for the first time, a strong emphasis 
on multilateralism, international cooperation and its significance for the Euro-
pean Union: Europe as a community of values that is culturally oriented and 
seeks to place its values at the center of its relationship to the world.  
“When Europe engages with the World, culture has to be at the core of our 
foreign policy,” the EU Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini 
stated on 20 April 2016 at the Cultural Forum Brussels. But what culture are we 
speaking of? 
Cultural understanding 
There are two foundational concepts of culture employed in the European Com-
mission, which have essentially found their way into the Ministries of Culture 
of all Member States. One emphasises the economic benefits of culture; it sees 
culture as the driver of development in the sense of economic prosperity. Today 
especially, this means digitally-driven prosperity.  
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The other concept harks back to the UNESCO Cultural Report of Mexico 1982. 
This concept views culture as the foundation of a society and what makes it 
unique, and therefore assigns it a much higher priority. This concept is wonder-
ful for evoking emotions, but is much harder to grasp or even measure. This 
means political practice must be incorporated. 
Two of the EU's key cultural community programmes in recent years are the 
European Capital of Culture and the European Heritage Label.  
The European Capital of Culture has been a marked success as it offers the 
chance of a Europe-wide and, to a certain extent, EU-certified cultural market-
ing. The participant cities rightly recognise the huge potential for tourism, and 
thus economic development, in this programme.  
At the same time, the programme also ensures that, during the multi-year appli-
cation and preparation process, cities must embark on an integrated develop-
ment process based on the cultural paradigm, which structurally speaking takes 
them to a completely new plane in this regard.      
The programme of the European Heritage Label, which was launched in 2014 
and identifies elements of common European heritage, suffers not only from its 
low profile, but also from the fact that the participating Member States primarily 
provide national narratives for their sites. This programme has aptly illustrated 
how difficult it is for states and their respective cultural institutions and cultural 
dignitaries to break away from national narratives and incorporate them into a 
broader and more realistic European perspective. 
UNESCO's broad concept of culture, dating back to the 1982 World Cultural 
Conference in Mexico, gives us the opportunity to move away from the func-
tional and project-related interpretations of culture and to look more closely at 
what Europe should focus on. Of course, culture and cultural heritage play an 
absolutely central role in the European peace project. What do we share? At the 
same time, society and its concepts are continually in conflict. 
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If our membership and cultural identity in our societies at the heart of 
Europe are increasingly being recharged in a national sense, this is a 
matter of culture.  
If we become more susceptible to populist formulas that question the 
coexistence of diverse groups, this is a matter of culture. As illustrated 
in the conversation between Kubicki and Gauland3.  
If the digital transformation of our society encapsulates our standards 
and changes our understanding of civil rights and civil spaces, of pri-
vacy, self-determination and democracy, this is a matter of culture. 
If we do not address the political power of global platforms, which ex-
tends into all spheres of the economy and our personal lives, in a regu-
latory way, but strengthen them through competition and tax policy, this 
is a matter of culture. 
If our social, economic and political relationships are virtually deter-
mined through manipulation-intended software techniques, this is a 
matter of culture, specifically political culture.  
Cultural heritage is the most important resource that enables us to reflect on 
who we are and who we want to be, how we live and how we want to live. We 
and: we with others. Especially today, in times of ever-faster and more profound 
transformation, the concrete experience of these milestones of our historical 
transformation and reflection on our existence creates a free space of self-deter-
mination and cultural identification: it frees our imagination, we recognise con-
texts, and we can design counter proposals for social action.    
Constitution of the European Economic Area 
We are not only faced within Europe with the challenge of significantly increas-
ing awareness of the cultural substance of our societies and of the common cul-
tural foundation of the European Economic Area. There is a further task ahead.  
                                                          
3 F.A.Z. conversation Gauland v. Kubicki from 21.01.2018. www.faz.net /Politik / Inland 
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The Constitution of the European Economic Area, especially when we think of 
it culturally, raises the question of the relationship that we develop with neigh-
bouring regions. The most urgent question we must ask ourselves as Europeans 
is whether we see this neighbourhood policy in the traditional geopolitical per-
spective of national interests or as a European task.  
The establishment of the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ was a lesson in this 
regard. 
The French presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy had used the project for a 
Union pour la Méditerranée in the election campaign to strengthen France's role 
in Europe. Originally, only the Mediterranean countries of the EU Member 
States, led by France, were to be integrated into the Union. François Hollande, 
to a certain extent, insisted on mobilising the European southern axis, particu-
larly against Germany, whose influence is growing increasingly stronger in the 
EU.  
Neighbourhood Policy 
In the meantime, with the “European Neighbourhood Policy”4 and, since 2010, 
the “Union for the Mediterranean”, we have genuinely European instruments to 
bring this partnership to life. Two examples:  
With “Euromed Heritage”, the European Union implemented a €60 million pro-
gramme over ten years, involving 400 partners from the EU and the MENA 
region, including very interesting projects on the region's audio-visual heritage, 
water issues and cultural practice in the field of intangible cultural heritage.  
In a study for Tunisia in 2012, “EuropeAid” examined the possibilities of 
providing a new impetus for regional development through cultural heritage and 
cultural tourism while generating jobs for young unemployed adults and aca-
demics.  
                                                          
4 Cf. EU communication regarding southern neighbourhood policy of 8 March 2011 
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The quality of the European Partnership Policy depends on its coherence, on 
special national interests and on whether it is in the sense of good neighbour-
hood policy, in line with the true needs of partner countries.  A “framing” of the 
“shared heritage” concept adopted by the European Year of Cultural Heritage 
2018 seems obvious. 
Concept of shared heritage 
Shared heritage – if we have this understanding, it offers the greatest oppor-
tunity to create mutual understanding and openness that is too often at risk in 
political and cultural disputes. It is a concept that underlies the UNESCO World 
Heritage Convention adopted in Paris in 1972, a treaty of international law that 
has now been ratified by 193 states.  
In experiencing this world heritage, borders become inconsequential and new 
relationships are established. The diversity of world heritage leaves us aston-
ished and simultaneously conveys, in a form of subtext, a concrete view of the 
will and dignity of humans as creators. The diversity of the heritage reveals the 
deep inner connection between all cultures. What we learn is that local identity 
creation can succeed within a universal perspective of mutual recognition. We 
also concurrently practice one of the arguably most important perspectives of 
our time – that of the world citizen. 
Its origins are bequeathed to us from the past, but its importance and cultural 
value derives from its impact on the reality of life and as a resource for the 
shaping of future realities of life. The same is true for any heritage. When we 
speak of world heritage, we also link the revolutionary idea of the interconnect-
edness of universal heritage with the idea of world peace. 
Because the UNESCO World Heritage List adopts the cultural-historical sensi-
tive demand of Karl-Friedrich Schinkel for monument inventories in the per-
spective of national treasures, but goes far beyond in that it tangibly links na-
tional heritage as part of a global heritage, this commits us to responsible cus-
todianship at the national level while broadening the national viewpoint with a 
human perspective.  
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The contemporary historical context 
For the emergence of this idea, the contemporary historical context was enor-
mously significant. The thesis of the ‘Limits of Growth’ of the first report by 
the Club of Rome generated a disruptive force at that time. The idea of a possi-
ble end to human history on this planet became concrete as a result of the Cold 
War and a newly emerging awareness of the ongoing destruction of the envi-
ronment as a consequence of human intervention in nature. The globally shared 
experience was one of destruction, boundlessness and endangerment.  
Moreover, the limits of human history became tangible: on 20 July 1969, an 
estimated 600 million people watched the Apollo 11 moon landing. For the first 
time in human history, a human being stood on solid ground outside our geo-
sphere and transmitted images of planet Earth as a fragile pale blue dot: Space-
ship Earth – a metaphor coined by architect and futurist Richard Buckminster 
Fuller, who popularised this new perception.  
A growing awareness of the looming destruction of the environment led to the 
organisation of the first United Nations World Environment Summit, held in 
Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972. With this summit, which was to lead to the 
creation of UNEP, the United Nations Environment Program, environmental 
protection was placed on the UN agenda.  
The fact that the UNESCO World Heritage Convention adopted five months 
later not only includes cultural assets but also nature sites can be traced to the 
Stockholm Summit. This resulted in the intriguing constellation that cultural 
heritage protection and nature conservation were combined in a single interna-
tional legal instrument.  
It is only a seeming coincidence that the UNESCO World Heritage Convention 
was adopted in the same year in which the nuclear bunker of the German gov-
ernment in Ahrweiler was fully commissioned. The UNESCO World Heritage 
List can be seen as the establishment of a registry of outstanding cultural crea-
tions; as a reservoir of meaning, to save humanity from slipping into the unre-
flective madness that permeated the air of the government bunker of Ahrweiler. 
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The meaning  
Against the backdrop of this madness, the world community established a mul-
tilateral concept of action – in the context of Luhmann, that structures emerge 
out of actions; in the sense of the UNESCO Constitution, which states: “That 
since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses 
of peace must be constructed.” 
The World Heritage idea reflects the call to understand all cultures principally 
as equals and preserve their highest goods in free responsibility. The program-
matic core goes much further: if the outstanding cultural sites5 and the great 
natural landscapes of this earth do not belong only to the nation states on whose 
territory they are located and who undertake commitments for their preserva-
tion, then they are the ideal possession of all humanity, and indeed both present 
and future generations, to which humanity has a duty to convey these testimo-
nies of a common history as authentically as possible.  
The idea of world heritage and convention thus separates the concept of culture 
and nature from that of the nation. This separation is one of the most valuable 
lessons to be learned from the history of the 20th century.  
The result is an understanding between nations based on mutual recognition of 
World Heritage Sites as places of learning, teaching and experiencing. It is no 
wonder, then, that they are the first target of violent conflict. 
Cultural property protection has become more than simply a matter for the UN 
Security Council and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, as well as 
legislative amendments, police training and conferences; it has engendered 
                                                          
5 The World Heritage List also includes the shadow sides of the past: the list also contains the concentration 
camp Auschwitz in Poland, the slave shipping island of Gorée im Senegal and the remains of the cathedral 
in Hiroshima as a monument to Peace – “Les lieux de mémoires” (Pierre Nora): Places of painful memory, 
testifying how thin the veneer of civilisation is. 
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countless impressive collaborations between states, UNESCO, foundations and 
international societies, as could be witnessed in the reconstruction of Timbuktu.  
An incipient world cultural policy 
Over the past 40 years, the concept of shared heritage has become the heart of 
world cultural policy and, in practical terms, the biggest success story of cultural 
cooperation among the peoples of the world. From the voluntary partial renun-
ciation of sovereignty by the states of the UNESCO Convention of 1972, the 
first internationally binding instrument of a protection concept for the cultural 
and natural heritage of the world emerged, assuming responsibility for the arte-
facts on its own soil: a contract with obligations that today binds almost all 
states.  
The next strong thread was pulled in world heritage domestic politics with the 
2005 Convention that sought to protect and promote the diversity of cultural 
expressions. In 2015, its provisions were updated for the digital era. It is a cul-
tural convention that does not refer to heritage, but rather to the creation of a 
political framework for the diversity of cultural expressions today; not protec-
tion alone, but promotion; not based on the past, but on the future, and this opens 
up an international legal framework for national cultural policies – this is alto-
gether new – for their legitimate action in times of global trade agreements and 
ever-expanding processes of concentration in the global cultural industries. 
In a unique way, this international instrument, which in the best case also feeds 
into new trade agreements, concerns itself with the question of how we want to 
live in the future. 
Europe’s role 
Europe played a crucial role in the creation of this most recent international 
instrument of world cultural and governance policy. The Council of the Euro-
pean Union succeeded in negotiating this treaty as a corporation within the mul-
tilateral organisation UNESCO: a novel phenomenon. The Presidency was held 
by the British, who led the European delegation. The European Union ratified 
this novel international agreement even before almost any other European 
Member State – even Germany. 
International cultural law has thus been integrated into the European Union as 
part of the EU’s legal architecture.  
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International law today determines EU cultural policy as well as that of its mem-
ber states. The Convention's understanding of the law increasingly determines 
relevant rulings of European courts. The values, principles and procedures of 
this international agreement, but especially the world perspective underpinning 
them, are now playing a noticeable role in the Mediterranean sphere as well.  
Mediterranean sphere  
Despite the seeming contradictions of this process, it was only possible to 
achieve a new quality of cultural cooperation with younger partners from civil 
society with the revolts and the social mobilisation seen in the Arab region from 
2011 onwards. These processes opened up thanks to art actions and new forms 
of public culture. The award-winning UNDP report on the situation of youth in 
Egypt in 2010 tells the tale, as well as the research report by the Anna Lindh 
Foundation on "Intercultural Trends and Social Change" published in the same 
year. 
So far, the Federal Government of Germany has responded and provided more 
than €130 million to the transformation partnership with a total of five coun-
tries in the MENA6 region, primarily for cultural and media training projects to 
create jobs for young adults: partnerships within the framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy based on locally determined requirements. 
Within the framework of the German Transformation Partnerships, the CON-
NEXXIONS programme contributes to strengthening civil society in the arts 
and culture sector and has been further developed into a knowledge partner-
ship for cultural diversity by 2018.7 
In Tunisia and Morocco, the programme met with great interest in the Ministries 
of Culture from the outset. From 2013 to 2016, this led to jointly designed in-
                                                          
6 MiddleEast_NorthAfrica 
7 Cf.: http://stories.unesco.de/buildingthefuture#142443;  
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house training courses, continuous collegial counselling, a nationwide work-
shop for cultural leaders and pilot formats for citizen forums on issues of cul-
tural participation.  
The frame of reference for this is the UNESCO Convention on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005), with its empha-
sis on an open society founded on democratic values. Prior to 2011, only four 
Arab states had ratified this human-rights-based instrument. Today, the number 
of Arab states has doubled, including four of the five Maghreb states since 2015, 
with Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. 
The constitutional changes enacted in Morocco (2011) and Tunisia (2014) dur-
ing this period are interesting. The preamble of the new Moroccan constitution 
uses cultural diversity as a key concept for state unity – a first in the Arab world: 
Morocco defines itself as Atlantic, Mediterranean and simultaneously desert-
influenced, with Judeo-Christian-Muslim traditions and cultural roots. This leit-
motif is very close to the European concept of "unity through diversity".  
The new Constitution of Tunisia expressly recognises artistic and scientific free-
doms. In 2012, Tunisia was the first Arab country to organise the World Press 
Freedom Day together with UNESCO, addressing the issue of the public and 
democracy; 
Meanwhile, until 2018 "SouthMed CV" focused on the political culture of pub-
lic space and the common good in the southern Mediterranean.8 In just three 
years, 38 local projects and 2,000 participants created a local cultural practice 
and set up a regional network. The project is currently being evaluated. 
Relations 
In the seven years since 2011, the German UNESCO Commission alone has 
been able to enter into in-depth work processes through two programmes with 
                                                          
8 The project will be co-funded by the European Commission’s EuropeAid programme within the context of 
the MedCulture programme of the European Neighbourhood Policy with the southern Mediterranean sphere 
(DG NEAR). The Arab partners come from Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. 
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around 500 highly motivated cultural actors from civil society in the transfor-
mation countries of the region and to reach a further 2,000 experts within the 
framework of SouthMedCV.  
This innovative cultural practice is despite the interested target group still little 
known, both in the region itself and in Europe/Germany. 
That is why DUK 2017, together with the European Cultural Foundation and 
one Moroccan and one Lebanese/Syrian partner, has prepared succinct exam-
ples as an e-publication, which went online this year and can certainly be seen 
as a contribution to the European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018. http://sto-
ries.unesco.de/buildingthefuture#1424439 
If, in the European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018, the German BMZ is in-
volved for the first time in the cultural sector in this region and launches the 
project "Music for Sustainable Development" in cooperation with Morocco and 
UNESCO, this is at least as pleasing as the future laboratory of the Deutsche 
Kammerphilharmonie Bremen "New Social Perspectives through Music” in Tu-
nis: Job and income opportunities are to be created for young music talents, and 
opportunities will be opened up to acquire the cultural richness of the musical 
expressions of the region, through the centuries and into the 21st century. In a 
way, the melody of its life. (https://seafile.kammerphilhar-
monie.com/d/b87048b207/) 
It is clear that this neighbouring region, which is so significant for Europe, has 
no easy path to follow: the 2017 Arab Democracy Index sees positive develop-
ments, particularly in Tunisia and Morocco, while development in Egypt is re-
gressing at full speed and Lebanon and Jordan are also both facing serious in-
ternal tensions, not least as the primary host countries for refugees from the 
                                                          
9 http://stories.unesco.de/buildingthefuture#142443; among them the artist residence project “Heritage for 
Creativity and Development” of the University of Al Quaraouyine, Fez, one of the oldest universities world-
wide. This should significantly increase the visibility of transformative cultural activities. 
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region. The November 2016 Arab Human Development Report titled "Empow-
ering Young People to Shape Their Future". In 2011, it stated: “The Arab world 
is richer than it is developed.” 
Cultural cooperation, artistic exchange, initiatives in the cultural-economic sec-
tor and the references to heritage, creativity and development cannot solve the 
essential structural questions and blockades alone. However, they do strengthen 
people, activities and groups who are actively involved in this, instilling in them 
the courage and clarity to design feasible visions of the future.  
If we learn – from which we are still a long way off – to understand ourselves 
culturally as Europeans and to distance ourselves from strict national format-
ting, we can then also appreciate the Mediterranean as a historical, contempo-
rary and future cultural space, which is a central element in the emergence of 
Europe. If this is what primarily came of The European Year of Cultural Herit-
age 2018, that would be wonderful!  
Incidentally, organ building, which was included in UNESCO's "Intangible 
Heritage" programme this year, was invented in Egypt!  
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The Golden Rule: A Principle on which Christians, Jews, Muslims 
and Secularists might agree?  
By Costa Carras 
At our 2017 conference at Heraklion entitled “Europe and the Mediterranean” I 
was asked to speak on the subject of “Religion and Politics”. Not surprisingly I 
opposed negative political stereotyping of any religion, more specifically in the 
present context Islam, while pointing out that some Christian Churches in the 
past and several movements in Islam today have held back the liberalisation and 
democratisation of their societies. Rather more controversially for my audience, 
I also suggested that the religious element in our cultural traditions may have 
something valuable to offer in respect of the problems our world faces today. 
I continue to hold both positions but would now add that one of the most healthy 
paths to liberalisation is when a majority in a country whose chief democratic 
feature is popular elections, but has not yet achieved a separation of powers, 
comes to decide that such elections are not sufficient for its people to consider 
their country a full democracy. This has recently occurred very dramatically in 
a Muslim majority country, namely Malaysia; might conceivably happen in a 
week from now in Turkey; while there are also signs of such a tendency among 
Iraqis.  There is therefore some evidence that my first major thesis may turn out 
to be correct and if this is confirmed by events it will represent very good news 
indeed and not just for the countries concerned. 
This year however it is my second thesis I would like to take further. I shall do 
so by examining what is called the Golden Rule, which no-one will deny is an 
important part of the cultural heritage of many parts of the world, certainly in-
cluding both Europe and the Near East, and all the more interesting because its 
roots are more surely embedded in Judaeo-Christian than in Hellenic or Roman 
soil. 
I shall begin by asking how widespread recognition of such a general but not 
exclusive guide to moral and political conduct is, a question to which my 
knowledge of the field is inadequate to provide a full but to which I can suggest 
a partial answer.   My second question, the crucial one, is whether we need the 
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Golden Rule as an active part of our moral and political discourse today. As my 
answer to this question will be affirmative, my third aim will be to draw out 
some of the consequences. 
First, two distinctions within the Golden Rule. One is evident:  the Golden Rule 
can be expressed in a milder negative form or a more challenging positive form.   
This distinction is crystal clear:  Rabbi Hillel, about 100 years before Christ, 
stated one should not do to others whatever one would not wish another to do 
to oneself. Like most formulations of the Golden Rule, this was not intended as 
a complete moral teaching but as a summary and a valuable guideline: no-one, 
for instance, would wish to robbed by another person so no-one should rob an-
other person. 
The strong and more challenging form expressed by Jesus and recorded both in 
Matthew and Luke’s Gospel is that we should positively act towards others as 
we would wish them to act towards us. This challenges us to see other people, 
not necessarily every other person at every time, as no less a potential centre of 
equal concern for us than we are to ourselves. Clearly this is a more difficult 
challenge and furthermore one which cannot be translated into the form of a 
prescription of specific actions.   The intention is clear enough however, namely 
that other people should in principle be as important to us as self-evidently we 
are to ourselves.   This entails a radical change in our existential stance, from 
which important and indeterminate consequences will flow. It is a principle 
which does not attempt to dictate specific decisions when we are faced by spe-
cific choices, as we indeed are, every day of our lives, since this would cancel 
one of every human being’s most basic characteristics, namely our extensive, 
though never total, freedom of choice. It does however forcefully recommend 
to us how we should exercise that freedom of choice. 
The other distinction between various versions of the Golden Rule is, unlike the 
first, not at all evident from the specific form of words employed by a specific 
teacher.   This concerns the definition of “the other”. “Love your neighbour as 
yourself” may be less revolutionary than the words appear to us today if, for 
instance, one’s neighbour is defined as a fellow townsman or a fellow Jew. 
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This in turn explains why the Parable of the Good Samaritan recorded in Luke’s 
Gospel is even more revolutionary than Jesus’ positive formulation of the 
Golden Rule.   It does not just imply that Jews should treat Samaritans as neigh-
bours, it is that Jesus’ listeners, Jews like himself, should learn from the example 
of a Samaritan who behaved in an exemplary manner towards a complete 
stranger, treating him as a neighbour, something of which a Jewish priest and 
Levite alike had proven incapable.   The Rule therefore as Jesus enunciated it is 
not just meant to apply to everybody in the future:  it already applied in practice 
and his listeners were called to pattern their behaviour on that of those who 
applied it, even were they not from among the Chosen People. 
Then of course there is a third issue, this time not of distinction but of context.   
Those who wish to bring objections to the Golden Rule correctly point out it 
cannot be the sole guide to conduct. This does not however negate the value of 
an approach to the exercise of human free will that requires us to consider others 
as much as ourselves when we make ethical or political choices. 
If we look below the surface we can catch a glimpse of the creative influence of 
the Golden Rule in one of the most important modern theories of justice, that 
argued by the American philosopher John Rawls. His theory posits that justice 
should be seen conceptually as a social and political situation which is consid-
ered satisfactory to themselves by individuals who at the time of making their 
choice as to social and political arrangements did not know what social and 
economic position in society they would be occupying themselves.   The con-
sequences of such a hypothetical exercise would in his view be substantive but 
not absolute equality between citizens, in this way fulfilling the Golden Rule’s 
guiding principle that we should see others to be equivalent subjects of activity 
and concern as we see ourselves. 
Fourth and finally we must very carefully distinguish the Golden Rule from the 
principle of reciprocity, as expressed in the Latin phrase “do ut des”. Reciproc-
ity represents the usual basis of daily life.   In most societies, ours no less than 
others in the past, it is based on the search for mutual – or in another phrase, 
“enlightened” – self interest. The Golden Rule is very different from any prin-
ciple of reciprocity: there was clearly nothing the man who had fallen among 
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thieves on the road to Jericho could give the Good Samaritan in return for eve-
rything the Good Samaritan had done for him. 
The example of John Rawls from the modern secular age suggests the range of 
Golden Rule thinking has historically been very wide, indicating that it may lie 
deeper in human attitudes to one another than we initially think. Even in periods 
where slavery was common and social differences huge, for example in a late 
period papyrus from Egypt which derives from before Alexander’s conquest in 
323, we can read an example of the milder negative form “That which you hate 
to be done to you, do not do to another”. From the Greek fourth century in the 
West to Confucius in China, from the Mahabarata in India to Zoroastrian texts, 
from the Rabbi Hillel to the Caliph Ali, the negative form of the Golden Rule, 
more frequently, and the positive form, less frequently, appears again and again.   
Clearly it is the range of the command, which makes the greatest difference – 
whether it applies to kinsfolk, tribe, city, nation or to all people.   The significant 
point for us to remember is that it is in this last form, as applying to all human 
beings, that the Golden Rule has reached us. It is in this form that Christians, 
Muslims, Jews and secularists now know it, even if we rarely practice it.   But 
since when was any general rule of moral guidance not honoured more in the 
breach than the observance?   
I now turn to my second and more crucial question. If the Golden Rule as one 
of the guiding principles for living is a strong but latent presence in most of the 
traditions we adhere to, are there any considerations relevant to the challenges 
of our own time, that encourage us to bring it front stage from the background 
position it currently holds? My answer will be positive. 
For lack of time and space I shall mention just four examples of types of ethico-
political discourse, which are very common in our own age and to illustrate why 
they are not, whereas the Golden Rule is, adequate to open the overgrown foot-
path on which we appear to be travelling. 
One is the discourse of civic entitlement combined with the legitimacy given to 
such language by democratic dialogue and decision-making. This language is 
sturdily and soundly based on our cultural heritage stemming from the Ancient 
Hellenes as recovered and reinterpreted among various peoples in the Americas 
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and Europe between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, since when it has 
become one of the fundamental ideologies of our contemporary world. 
A second is the discourse of human liberties and rights emphatically to be dis-
tinguished from the language of democratic decision-taking and civic entitle-
ment because it assumes that a human being has a value outside and inde-
pendently of any polity. This mode of discourse has become infinitely more 
powerful since the Second World War and the adoption of Declarations of Hu-
man Rights after the horrors of Fascism, Nazism and Stalinist Communism in 
Europe and colonialist imperialism in large segments of the rest of the world, 
imprinted themselves on human consciousness. 
A third is the discourse of enlightened or mutual self-interest, a form of dis-
course which has gained greatly in popularity compared to any ideological sys-
tem since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, to the point indeed of having been 
adopted also by the Chinese continuators of Communist ideology. This is a form 
of financial, political and, to a marginal degree, ethical discourse whose central 
thrust is to replace both ethical and ideological considerations with the search 
for mutual interest on a basis of reciprocal advantage.   In this type of discourse, 
to give but one example, the phrase “moral hazard” is commonly reduced to a 
single type of such hazards, namely the danger of irresponsible borrowing lead-
ing to default. Anyone who has lived in the real world knows there are many 
more “moral hazards” than this, amongst them, for instance, sale of goods on 
false pretences or through systematic bribery:  these two are less commonly 
mentioned not because such “moral hazards” do not exist but because they can 
be concealed or reinterpreted in terms of mutual interest.   A large part of our 
intra-European crisis is rooted in excessive use of this type of language and 
vocabulary. 
Fourth and last in this list of types of ethico-political discourse, I shall mention 
that based on environmental considerations, in turn related to the powerful west-
ern scientific tradition that has performed such wonders since the seventeenth 
century, and that today represents one of the most powerful segments of our 
shared cultural heritage. This discourse in general is antithetical to the third, that 
based on the search for reciprocal self-interest, because it sets ever more severe 
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limits on how much of the consequences of the operation of mutual interest 
discourse is compatible with maintaining ecological balance. We should be less 
surprised than we have affected to be therefore at the rejection of environmental 
discourse by a populist US Administration: it gets in the way of society’s real 
business, as a businessman obsessed with self-interest sees it. 
I have mentioned four types of discourse which are prevalent and powerful in 
our societies. Are we not doing well enough with those we already have? Why 
might we need a fifth? 
The unpleasant truth that our present systems of discourse are grossly inade-
quate in coming challenges can, I believe, be revealed merely through an exam-
ination of the migration crisis since the implosion of Syria between 2011 and 
2015, combined with the continued pressure on European borders from the 
poorer lands to the south, particularly those already suffering fierce pressure 
from ongoing climate change. 
Did the four types of discourse mentioned assist Europe in developing a com-
mon response to the crisis? Not a bit of it.   Four countries indeed made some 
attempt and all four were denied the benefit of European solidarity. Sweden 
tried first and its liberal approach based on a recognition of the human rights of 
asylum seekers has been effectively rejected by its body politic, insistent on 
both its identity and its entitlements; Germany tried more methodically than 
anyone else, with the additional argument that migrants were needed to main-
tain the country’s economic success, and met a mixed response from which 
however the only ultimate political conclusion to be drawn is that this issue 
destroys class solidarity to the advantage of racial and nationalist prejudice;  
Greece and Italy, victims both of geography and disorganisation, could not cope 
without European solidarity which on this issue proved a figment of the Euro-
pean Union’s imagination.    
The problem will not go away? Our whole planet is in the grip of long-lasting 
illness which is the long-term consequence of our very human desire to be free 
of the shackles placed on us by nature. The disease is technologically curable if 
we have the will to cure it but so long as a sufficient number of us does not, our 
overall situation will continue to worsen. As it worsens more and more areas of 
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our planet will become less livable, which entails greater competition for more 
limited resources. So when eight – or however many there may be – well ad-
ministered EU member states tell their fellows that there should be no increase 
in EU expenditure they are being as existentially irresponsible as some other 
member states have been financially irresponsible – if in the opposite sense! – 
in allocating resources to their citizens beyond their country’s productive limits. 
In terms of what type of discourse, you may legitimately ask, is this stance “ex-
istentially irresponsible”.  The answer must be that it is entirely consistent with 
democratic norms and with this enlightened self-interest in the maximisation of 
their citizens’ prosperity:  and that it is not inconsistent with support of human 
rights around the world. These countries therefore can and perhaps do feel mor-
ally self-satisfied. Even in the realm of environmental discourse they can say 
that they are, compared with other countries, ahead of the game and, in some 
instances at least, assisting others to catch up. They are however failing in rela-
tionship to the Golden Rule because their own people’s prosperity comes first 
even when others are being reduced to misery and not only will they make only 
a token contribution themselves but they will not allow the European Union to 
make an adequate contribution either. 
The truth is that we are missing an entire class of ethical/political discourse 
through which people of good will can come to appreciate the reality they are 
missing because the forms of discourse currently acceptable are inadequate for 
our situation. And thus it is that I can now answer our second question, yes, we 
desperately need the Golden Rule. If we do not add this as a fifth, equivalently 
valid and valuable form of discourse as the others, we are, in my view, doomed 
to failure. To bring Golden Rule discourse to the foreground would represent 
an enlightenment in the literal sense of allowing light to illuminate an existing 
reality which is currently part purposefully, part innocently being obscured from 
our consciousness. There would be changes for each and all of us. The most 
significant change, when speaking of a collective rather than an individual re-
sponse however, might and should be the choice of the most crucial points at 
which to make the European Union’s presence felt, in the far abroad, the near 
abroad and at home. 
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Let me end by listing four challenges, all colossal, all related to the critical ques-
tion, “On what should the EU concentrate its energies in relation to this form of 
discourse?” 
The first challenge is to achieve an integrity in the European response to our 
world crisis and this may prove the most serious challenge of all. We need to 
acknowledge, first, that Europe cannot bear every burden; but, second, that we 
cannot even carry all the burden we should carry, precisely because we are dem-
ocratic societies where public opinion counts.   It has become clear, for instance, 
that human rights declarations and public commitments notwithstanding, a ma-
jority of European peoples cannot accept large migration flows. Clearly this is 
partly a matter of the particular mix of migrants at any one time, partly a matter 
of numbers, partly the strength of national sentiment in nation states.   If this is 
so however, then European countries are clearly obligated to make a far greater 
effort to keep potential migrants happily in their present homes rather than to 
recruit unpleasantly despotic regimes to prevent those already determined to 
leave, from arriving on Europe’s shores. And that entails a drastically revised 
and dramatically increased EU budget, for the benefit of no EU country but 
rather of countries in the “far and near abroad”, as seen from an European point 
of view but with an European as well as an international end in view, namely 
that we should be acting responsibly within the limits permitted by popular Eu-
ropean discourse. 
For others to accept our integrity of purpose it is important to distinguish clearly 
between the frequent technical and hence temporal limitations in bringing the 
standards of any industry or service up to the level required so as to begin to roll 
back climate change, something which is acceptable in principle, although sub-
ject to discussion and dispute, and, on the other hand, the falsification of evi-
dence which is destructive of integrity.   An objective difficulty can be acknowl-
edged since every people and every industry or service faces objective difficul-
ties.   On the other hand, nothing could have been worse for the European image 
as a whole than that it was possible for such a long period for important national 
industries to produce falsified statistics and that it should not have been the EU 
which discovered or prevented it. 
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In the far abroad the EU contribution can admittedly only be palliative and not 
structural. This does not mean it lacks value. When faced with such fundamental 
developments as the erosion of the Sahel and more generally of the territory of 
overpopulated Middle Eastern countries;  or the melting of the Tibetan icecap 
which is already turning mighty rivers into dirty ditches among the billions of 
people in East, Southeast and South Asia dependent on that icecap for their wa-
ter, the EU cannot resolve the problems but can contribute a combination of 
integrity, generosity and technological expertise.It cannot however aspire to a 
leading role. 
By contrast, in the near abroad, in instances for instance like the young Tunisian 
democracy or the older Lebanese consociational democracy, the situation is 
very different. Here the EU can make a critical difference from a financial, a 
security and an institutional point of view, and should already have done so, 
through the development of a multi-faceted security, political and economic 
policy, years ago. The IMF may need to behave to Tunisia as to all its other 
members:  the EU could and should play a different role, closer to that played 
by the US in post-war Europe. Lebanon is far more sensitive – but could not the 
EU agree, for instance, to undertake the creation of a refuse management and 
recycling system in a country that clearly and indeed desperately needs it?   
Might it not include both Lebanon and Tunisia in the EU’s wider cultural com-
munity? And might it not build on the shared European cultural heritage of the 
two communities in Cyprus, a member state, to provide that sense of security 
which is essential to achieve a political settlement? 
Finally, the home front, where developments have in the last few years been 
going from bad to worse. Why? Because many member states have systemati-
cally derided the extraordinary achievements of the European Commission, Eu-
ropean Parliament and European Central Bank over the years. Let me give just 
five examples of major achievements: the ERASMUS programme, which has 
created a new and  hopefully multicultural generation, markedly so in the UK;  
the NATURA programme one of the best, if not the most advanced, nature pro-
tection network in the world;  the Creative Europe programme and now the Eu-
ropean Year of Cultural Heritage which simultaneously celebrate and express 
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what most unites us;  the environment and a proactive response to climate 
change that have become a distinguishing characteristic of European political 
and economic identity; all the features for a banking union already in place and 
awaiting completion. 
In face of such and many other achievements European nation states shame-
lessly demand that they and not central European organs, should undertake fu-
ture responsibilities, insisting on confining any European vision within national 
blinkers.   Not least is this so in facing the greatest challenge of all, one on which 
far too little has thus far been attempted, namely in developing a meaningful 
European security policy. Here the major issue is not the percentage of GNP 
each member spends on security, although this is what makes the newspapers:  
it is whether whatever is done expresses a joint effort and a united vision. In 
order to behave generously and creatively to others as we would wish others to 
deal with us, Europe must be a “we”, not a collection of separate units who talk 
high about solidarity but practice low and traditionally divisive state politics, as 
is still and, ever more tragically, occurring today. 
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Knowledgeable Coexistence as a Key for Christian-Muslim  
Relations in the Near East – Experiences form the Project  
‘Recalled Future’  
By Thomas Würtz 
The Conflict 
The project “Recalled Future” (Erinnerte Zukunft)3 was conceived and initiated 
in 2015 by the Catholic Academy Berlin, together with the Bonifatiuswerk.4 
Behind this project lay the desire to ensure that the conflicts between various 
religious communities and confessions in the Near East, now exposed and 
strengthened by the long lasting war in Syria and the ongoing instability in the 
neighbor country Iraq since 2003, would not be continued among the refugees 
who fled to Germany. It is well known that these conflicts are often due to the 
fact that Christians or the various Christian churches in the Orient and Muslim 
groups in the civil war are on different sides. The solidarity of many Syrian 
Christians with the regime of Bashar al-Asad is an example of this. But this 
influence of political conditions on the life of the religious communities is not 
limited to the acceptance or rejection of the respective political rulers. Also the 
individual events of the conflicts have effects on the religious communities. 
Thus many Christians returned here after the expulsion of the so-called "Islamic 
State" from the northern Iraqi Nineveh plain.  
But when as a result of the failed Kurdish independence referendum of 25 Sep-
tember 2017 Shiite militias came to the area to withdraw the territory from 
Kurdish control, this led to the renewed flight of Christians and also Yezidi in-
habitants.5 In Syria, Kurds are using the new leeway in self-administration to 
establish an educational programme in the Kurdish language, but this does not 
                                                          
3 For more information see: www.erinnerte-zukunft.de 
4 The Bonifatiuswerk dedicates itself to the concerns of Catholics in the Diaspora. 
5 Weiss, Martin: Rückschlag auf dem Weg zur Selbständigkeit – Kurdistan-Irak vor und nach dem Unab-
hängigkeitsreferendum. In: Seufert, Günter (Ed.): Die Kurden im Irak und in Syrien nach dem Ende der 
Territorialherrschaft des „Islamischen Staates“, SWP-Studie 11, Juli 2018, Berlin, p. 9-27, 23. 
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offer any prospects for Arabic-speaking Christians and reinforces their tenden-
cies to emigrate.6 
The idea for the title “Recalled Future” goes back to the fact that, over a long 
period of time, the religions present in the Near East were indeed able to exist 
and prosper side by side. This contiguity and trust was damaged, but – hopefully 
– not completely destroyed by the war in Syria and the political turmoil in Iraq. 
What happened here was mainly due to political developments, while the basic 
religious beliefs remained as far as possible. But there is a danger that the opin-
ions of those of different faiths will increasingly deteriorate. So, the time has 
come to create memories for the future. Although the situation in Syria and Iraq 
taken together with the arrival of the many refugees initially triggered these 
considerations, the ancient tradition of good relations between the religions and 
the simultaneous smoldering of confessional conflicts are not restricted to the 
Fertile Crescent area, e.g. mainly Syria and Iraq. Rather, it is a phenomenon 
found in numerous countries of the Near and Middle East. Thus it is worth to 
have a look at the history of coexistence. 
The Background 
Christians and Muslims have coexisted in the Near East at least since the early 
Muslim conquests during the 7th century AD. Since that time, Christians of 
many different confessions have lived under the political sovereignty of Mus-
lims, though this did not necessarily constitute for them a form of “foreign dom-
ination”.7 In a way, the Muslim conquest relieved the local elites of the central-
ization push in the late Roman and Sassanid empires. This also meant that the 
yields of the respective regions remained local and did not have to be largely 
transferred to the metropolis of the empire.8 Similar observations can be made 
at the level of religions: As early as in the 4th and 5th centuries AD, early ecu-
menical councils led the Coptic Christians living in Egypt and the Orthodox 
                                                          
6 Lack, Katharina: Die Lage in den kurdischen Gebieten Syriens: Politische Akteure und ihre Entwicklung 
seit 2011. In: Seufert, Günter (Ed.): Die Kurden im Irak und in Syrien nach dem Ende der Territorialherr-
schaft des „Islamischen Staates“, SWP-Studie 11, Juli 2018, Berlin, p. 58-75, 67. See especially reference 
87. 
7 Berger, Lutz: Die Entstehung des Islam. Die ersten hundert Jahre, München 2017, p. 148ff. 
8 Berger, Entstehung, p. 279. 
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Christians in Syria to reject the teachings of the Patriarch of Constantinople. 
According to the well-known Quran expert, Angelika Neuwirth, the Quran, 
which serves as the basis for all Muslim beliefs, may also be seen as a text of 
its era – late antiquity – and as a contribution to the debates that decisively in-
fluenced the intellectual and religious life in Mediterranean region since the fall 
of the Western Roman Empire.9 In this sense, Islam as a “commitment to the 
One God” was more acceptable to many residents of the Levant than one might 
suspect. However converting to Islam represented a definitive step for an indi-
vidual. At the macro level, conversion in the countries of the Middle East was 
again a very slow and a rather gentle transition.  
Nevertheless, the various religious communities remained good neighbors, and 
many regions (with the exception of North Africa) were influenced by both 
Muslim and Christian culture for centuries. Since the project "Recalled Future" 
is aimed at refugees from Syria and Iraq, it is necessary to shorten the historical 
view here and above all to look at the political structure from which the two 
countries emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. This political structure 
was the Ottoman Empire, which appeared on the political map of the Middle 
East at the beginning of the 14th century and had a decisive influence on the 
region of the eastern Mediterranean for many centuries. The Ottoman “millet 
system” was the living proof of the interreligious coexistence: It allowed each 
individual community (milla) to take care of its own business, demanding from 
subjects only a certain measure of taxes and tributes along with accepting the 
Sultan as ruler. This form of coexistence was secured through imperial rul-
ership. Even if during the war for Crete at the end of the 17th century an in-
creased conversion pressure on Greek Christians became apparent,10 Greece as 
a whole would remain remained steadfast in its Orthodox Christian faith during 
many centuries of Ottoman rule. However, non-Muslim subjects did not have 
the same rights as Muslims either. In addition to higher taxation, there was also 
a ban on carrying weapons or riding a horse and certain dress codes.11 In the 
                                                          
9 Neuwirth, Angelika: Der Koran als Text der Spätantike. Ein europäischer Zugang, Berlin 2010, p. 22f. 
10 Howard, Douglas A.: A History of the Ottoman Empire, Cambridge 2017, p. 171. 
11 Gradeva, Rossitsa: On Zimmis and Church Buildings. Four Cases from Rumeli. In: Kermeli, E. & Özel, 
O. (Ed.): The Ottoman Empire. Myths, Realities and “Black Holes”. Contributions in Honour of Colin Im-
ber, Istanbul 2006, p. 203-237. 
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early phase of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman authorities took sons from 
Christian families to convert them to Islam and serve them in the army, where 
they were able to rise to high positions, which of course did not change the 
suffering of the families concerned.12 
The system was increasingly challenged, as European powers and above all 
France began to see itself as the protective power of the Christian citizens in the 
Ottoman Empire and to conclude corresponding contracts with the Ottoman 
government. Christians in particular profited from the developing long-distance 
trade with Europe. However, since the Ottoman Empire was also repeatedly at 
war with the European powers, increasing tensions developed between Chris-
tians and Muslims, which led to violent conflicts around the middle of the 19th 
century. Muslims, however, did not accuse the Christians of being Christians, 
but of their solidarity with the Europeans.13 
The power relations shifted fundamentally during the colonial times, when Eu-
ropean Christians steadily came to replace the Muslim rulers. Confessional af-
filiations were rather strengthened, from the outside insofar as France created 
its own political entities for the Druzes and Alawites after assuming the mandate 
in Syria in 1922.14 However, in their attempt to overcome the colonial efforts, 
Near East societies did not summon up their religion, but rather oriented them-
selves to secular Western ideologies. The Ba’th ideology, for example, co-
founded by Michel Aflak (1910 – 1989), a Christian, was the attempt to com-
bine Arabic nationalism and socialist-egalitarian concepts in order to create a 
postcolonial, united Arabia in which religion had no place. The slogan of the 
party was “Arab unity, liberty, and socialism”.15 Yet its failure during the 1960s 
and 1970s, along with the results of continuing political, social, and economic 
stagnation compared to the successes of Western civilization gave raise to a new 
search for solutions. Once again, religion and its highly principled interpreta-
tions reflected the zeitgeist: The phenomenon of Islamization was born.16 At the 
                                                          
12 Howard, Ottoman Empire,  p.98. 
13 Howard, Ottoman Empire, p.256; Cleveland, Wiliam L. & Bunton, Martin: A History of the Modern Mid-
dle East, Boulder 2013, p. 84. 
14 Cleveland & Bunton, Modern Middle East, p. 203f. 
15 Anderson, Betty S., A History of the Modern Middle East, Stanford 2016, p. 300. 
16 Anderson, A History, p. 404. 
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same time, the tendency can be observed among Christians in the Orient to em-
phasize differences more strongly. Yet even then, the need to preserve good 
neighborly relations persisted in everyday life. 
The escalation that occurred after the second Iraq war of 2003, which President 
George W. Bush ineptly referred to as a “crusade,” and the events following the 
so-called Arabic Spring of 2011 (especially the uprising and subsequent civil 
war in Syria) have made peaceful coexistence in the Near East very difficult. 
There are - as already mentioned at the beginning - many examples of conflicts 
that currently challenge this coexistence so strongly; just two are mentioned 
here: The houses of many Christians living in the Ninive Plane in Northern Iraq 
were looted by Muslims, whereas some Christians in Syria seem to end up prof-
iting from the successes of the regime during the last years of the civil war. 
Failure to obtain more knowledge about the other’s religious beliefs, such as 
can be obtained in an interreligious dialog, stands in the way of expressing any 
opposition to the political instrumentalization of religion(s). Therefore, it is dif-
ficult to simply resume the ways of life before the drastic events of the years 
since 2003, when the political conditions in the Middle East have stabilized 
again. This is not the place to outline what would be necessary for a political 
and social new beginning, but some cornerstones for a renewed form of interre-
ligious coexistence can be identified. 
The Concept 
This is where the concept of the “Recalled Future” project comes into play. On 
the one hand, Germany and its own path toward overcoming political divides 
can serve as a neutral example of what is possible. The technical term, which 
emerge during the 90ies is “Culture of memory” (Erinnerungskultur). The Ger-
man culture of remembrance is characterised by the fact that not only its own 
victims are lamented and heroised during the war, but that the victims of its own 
crimes are at the centre of remembrance.17 Even if German history during the 
Nazi era cannot be directly compared with the current political crisis in the Mid-
dle East, the impression remains that experiences from the German culture of 
                                                          
17 Assmann, Aleida: Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur. Eine Intervention, München 2016, p. 
11. 
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remembrance can point the way to a revival of the coexistence of the various 
religious communities. But all reports of post-conflict rehabilitation and recon-
ciliation have in common that the recognition of each other's victims is a very 
important component.18 As already mentioned, this recognition is also found in 
the German culture of remembrance and can be well illustrated in a place like 
Berlin, where our project is carried out. The German culture of remembrance 
can thus serve as a model to a certain extent, but at the same time it seems neu-
tral for the current conflicts in Syria and Iraq, forming a “third place” (Dritter 
Ort) as it were. The culture of remembrance in itself must be distinguished from 
concrete places of remembrance (lieu de mémoire), especially since the latter 
can often be culturally conceived and have positive connotations throughout.19 
In the case of the Berlin Wall, however, such a place of remembrance is inter-
woven with the culture of remembrance.20 That is why we have integrated it 
into our project.21 
Another of these cornerstones would be the transformation of the neighbour-
hood of different religions and confessions to a more knowledgeable coexist-
ence of all denominations fostered by interreligious experiences. The existing 
interreligious dialog in many western countries and its goal of a better under-
standing of the beliefs of other confessions is what is now so urgently needed 
in the Middle East. Demonizing the followers of another religion or rejecting 
their beliefs completely is always easier to do if you know little or nothing about 
them: Is the friendly neighbor in fact nothing but a hidden enemy? In what fol-
lows I will give you an insight, how we tried to establish this transmission of 
images by promoting better interreligious competence. 
The project implementation (May 2017 – January 2018) 
                                                          
18 With regard to already existing models for coming to terms with violent conflicts and approaches for rec-
onciliation work, we at the Catholic Academy have taken up the examples of Bosnia, Rwanda and Peru.  
19 Schulze, Hagen & Francois, Etienne (Ed.): Deutsche Erinnerungsorte I-III, München 2009. 
20 Wolfrum, Edgar: Die Mauer. In: Schulze, Hagen & Francois, Etienne (Ed.) Deutsche Erinnerungsorte I, 
München 2009, p. 552-568, p. 566f. 
21 Recently, literature has also increasingly been asking whether elements of European history, such as the 
Thirty Years' War, have structural analogies to current events in the Middle East. This would argue for a 
much stronger interweaving of knowledge of European history and the search for solutions to the problems 
in the Middle East. Münkler, Herfried: Der Dreissigjährige Krieg. Europäische Katastrophe, Deutsches 
Trauma 1618-1648, Berlin 2017, p. 834f. 
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a) The First Meeting 
The first meeting of the participants took place in the Catholic Academy in Ber-
lin on May 12-14, 2017, where the first topic of business was to get to know 
each other. Everyone from the mixed group of 22 Syrians, Iraqis and Yemenis 
reported his or her own story. After an introduction to the planned phases of the 
project, the first main theme that cropped up was that of the history of the Berlin 
Wall. During a visit to the Berlin Wall Memorial in the Bernauer Straße, a wit-
ness from that era told us how traumatic the building of the Berlin Wall was for 
the residents of Berlin. Finally, we also heard that in 1985 the East German 
government ordered the demolition of the Church of Reconciliation, which be-
came a powerful signal for the division of Berlin and the political implacability 
of the two political blocs during the Cold War. The project participants came to 
understand that 30 years ago Germany itself was faced with much more funda-
mental political problems than is the case today. The visit to the new Reconcil-
iation Chapel, which now stands on the same spot as the old church and serves 
as a reminder of the reunification process and the need to overcome barriers,22 
provided many parallels to the present situation in the Near East. The next day 
we heard the story of the East German refugee Maik Hupe, who reported how 
he made it into the West German consulate in Warsaw just a few months before 
the fall of the Wall. The fact that, in a not very distant past, the subject of fleeing 
one’s country was a topic of existential concern to Germans provided an im-
portant impulse to the refugees. 
b) Religious Diversity 
When the group reunited in July 2017, the most important theme addressed was 
that of religions. In her speech, Gerdi Nützel, a Protestant clergywoman made 
the connection between the flight of the Huguenots from France in the 18th cen-
                                                          
22 Götz, Thomas und Eichhorn, Peter: Berlin. Sakrale Orte/Sacred Places, Berlin 2010, p. 152. 
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tury to the present-day situation. She emphasized that Berlin has long been wit-
ness to the arrival of new confessional and religious groups. 23 The next day was 
devoted to directly experiencing the pluralistic religious reality of Berlin. 
In the Protestant Berlin Cathedral (Berliner Dom) the group learned much about 
the official role of the Hohenzollern, being present as figures in the church 
across from the great Reformers. This century-old close connection between 
religious affiliation and political power in a European country, even in light of 
religious tolerance, makes it clear that the modern idea of a religiously neutral 
central state is not as old as it might seem to be. But this example also gives 
hope that societies in which there is still a strong tie to a specific religion may 
still gain the courage to take new steps. 
Next, our tour of Berlin took us to the Meeting Center in Neukölln, a Sunni 
mosque.24 Then it was off to the Bulgarian-Orthodox church, now situated on 
the grounds of a former Protestant cemetery, which has its most important litur-
gical site within the old chapel and is visited by up to 2000 believers on the most 
important holy days. Finally, we visited the mosque of the Lahore group of the 
Ahmadiyya Community in Wilmersdorf (a controversial movement even within 
Islam). This mosque is the oldest extant mosque in Germany and was built be-
tween 1924 and 1927 by Muslims for Muslims.25 
c) A Look toward the Middle East 
The third meeting used the expanding trust within the group to turn away from 
the situation in Berlin and center more on the interreligious relations in the Near 
East. It was important to us not to look just at the present situation in that region, 
but also to study the past. Recall that the project was devoted to remembering 
the past of coexistence and making those memories valuable and profitable for 
the future. The first talk on the “History of Interreligious Relations in the Near 
East,” emphasized the situation in the 8th and 9th centuries. The speaker noted 
                                                          
23 Nützel, Gerdi: Historische Entwicklung der religiösen Vielfalt in und um Berlin. In: Kreutzinger-Herr, 
Annette et. al. (Hg.): Jeder nach seiner Facon. Vielfalt und Begegnung der Religionen in Berlin, Berlin 
2015, p. 25f. 
24 For more information have a look at: http://www.nbs-ev.de/ 
25 Backhausen, Manfred (Ed.): Die Lahore-Ahmadiyya-Bewegung in Europa, Wembley 2008, p. 51f. 
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how important it had been to the Abbasid caliphs, who ruled from 760 to 1258 
AD, that Christians were welcomed in their territory.  
The next day our tour in the Museum for Islamic Art began in the Aleppo Room, 
a magnificently decorated living room of a prosperous family from Aleppo. At 
first sight, the Oriential décor suggested that it was home to Muslims, but the 
depictions of Jesus and Mary on the walls soon revealed that they were in fact 
Christians. We discussed the art historical connections between ornaments from 
Islamic art and Christian art found in the museum.  
d) Lived Interreligiosity 
The next day was supposed to be devoted to a discussion of modern theology, 
in particular the fate of Father Paolo dall’Oglio, who had disappeared. Father 
dall’Oglio’s approach is based on his experiences in Syria while residing at the 
Mar Musa monastery, where he felt his call: “my love for Muslims and for Is-
lam”. In effect, this meant integrating Muslim religious practices in his own 
Catholic tradition, including a bare wall of the church facing toward Mecca with 
the inscription “Bismillah,” the prostration shown during prayers and the com-
mon fasting during Ramadan. An even deeper connection should develop 
through practical solidarity and shared spirituality.26 The goal of a “Church of 
Islam,” as dall’Oglio envisioned became the focus of discussion. Some consid-
ered this a syncretism, others an act of creating a new religion, still others a 
completely new form of commonality – even the start of a new revolution in the 
Near East that is not only desired but also desperately needed. Others, on the 
other hand, were more careful and pleaded for not overemphasizing the close-
ness of the two religions in order not to exclude the more conservative parts of 
their own society and put too much pressure on people’s religious tolerance. 
The fourth weekend was dedicated to the present-day situation. First, we visited 
a Syrian-Orthodox Church St. Jakob in Berlin-Tiergarten.27 Over the centuries, 
                                                          
26 Lika, Eva-Maria: „Kirche des Islam“. Zur Theologie Paolo Dall´Oglios. In: Geist & Leben. Zeitschrift für 
christliche Spiritualität. Heft 1Januar – März 2017, p. 33-40. 
27 Nützel, Gerdi: Erfahrungen der Heilsökonomie Gottes -  Die syrisch-orthodoxe Kirche St. Jakob. In: 
Kreutzinger-Herr, Annette et. al. (Hg.): Jeder nach seiner Facon. Vielfalt und Begegnung der Religionen in 
Berlin, Berlin 2015, p. 46-53. 
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Syrian-Orthodox Church was able to preserve its traditions and most of its fol-
lowers, even though their percentage share of the overall population has gone 
down continually during Muslim rule. Today, many members of this Syrian 
Church no longer even live in the region but are now spread all over the world 
– like those who attend the Berlin congregation. For many of the Muslim par-
ticipants it was moving to hear Amill Gorgis talk about the history of this church 
and to listen to some of the traditional hymns – things they were denied in their 
homeland and able to enjoy only now among their brethren in Germany. 
We then visited a Shiite mosque in Berlin-Mitte, which strives to represent all 
Shiite Muslims living in Berlin (some 8,000) and to provide ways to connect 
them with the relevant political actors. We spent the evening in a discussion of 
the role of the Shiite Hezbollah militia in the civil war in Syria. One member of 
the mosque community considered it a necessary defense against the upcoming 
and massively expanding so-called “Islamic State” in the years 2014 and 2015, 
but others in the group were quick to contradict: The rise of the Hezbollah was 
an expansive pro-Iranian and Shiite political movement intended to strengthen 
the position of the Shiites in Syria. This in part fierce debate clearly showed that 
it remains difficult to draw a clean line between political and religious interests. 
One participant summed it up by wondering how it could be that so many good 
things, like the social work of the mosque, and so many bad things, like the 
actions of Hezbollah in Syria with the many innocent civilian victims, could 
both be done in the name of a single religious confession. 
e) Anti-Semitism and Anti-Muslim Racism 
On the final project weekend, it was important to us to once again take a look 
at the culture of memory in Germany, which was already mentioned above as 
one starting point of our concept. Thus, this weekend was concerned with how 
to react to anti-Semitism as well as to modern anti-Muslim racism. The lectures 
emphasized both the differences as well as the similarities in these two phenom-
ena.  
An especially impressive aspect for the participants was the subsequent visit to 
Otto Weidt’s workshop for the blind in the area of Hackesche Höfe. During the 
Nazi era, Otto Weidt (1883 – 1947) himself a blind man employed many blind 
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persons as well as Jews in his manufacture for brooms and brushes to protect 
them from being deported. This was possible for him for a long time, since his 
business was considered important for the war and his products were delivered 
directly to the Wehrmacht. When this was no longer possible because of new 
laws enacted by the Nazi regime in Germany in 1943, he hid a number of the 
families in the small rooms of the manufacture, which we visited. Afterwards, 
the so-called “stumbling blocks” – bronze plaques embedded in the sidewalk to 
remember the deported Jews and other persons who had lived in the buildings 
– that lie between the museum and the Academy – and thus along the path back 
– took on a new and very immediate meaning. 
Conclusion 
Thus, the first and the final weekend of the project took place at neutral spots, 
which allowed us to discuss in detail and work through the wrongs that had been 
committed in Berlin and how they pertain to one’s own present-day situation. 
The experiences gained during this project suggest that attending to historical 
examples is an important aspect of judging one’s own situation and of enabling 
reconciliation, and that it can contribute to a process of healing. For many par-
ticipants this desire to reconcile also represented a spiritual need that was satis-
fied in a common interreligious prayer conducted at the chapel of the Academy.  
In March 2018, we were able to make our results available to a wider audience 
at a public event entitled "Insights into reconciliation work". In April of the 
same year, we received an invitation from the Swedish Church to hold a work-
shop in Gothenburg as part of the conference "Healing of Memories". There, 
too, we were able to report on our experiences and initial results to multipliers 
and activists in interreligious dialogue. Many asked about the continuity of the 
project and the further work with the group.28 As the persons in charge of the 
Catholic Academy, we saw this as confirmation of our own wish to continue the 
project, especially since Sweden is interested in carrying out the project in a 
similar way. 
                                                          
28 See: Healing of memories. Dokumentation av den Interreligiösa Konferensen, Editor: Henrik Frykberg, p. 
18-21. 
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In this regard, we plan to expand the concept by using the experiences from this 
phase and repeat the project in the autumn of 2019. We want to expressly in-
clude the participants from this phase and maintain contact with them. Recon-
ciliation work is a long-term process that may take months or even years to 
realize completely. 
It is thus our intention to revive the good old image of neighborliness in the 
Middle East but to draw it in the colors of a more knowledgeable coexistence. 
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Creating a Common Memory Space in Morocco 
By Sonja Hegasy 
Reconciliation through remembrance is a relatively new concept of coming to 
terms with a violent past. Since WWII it has expanded world-wide as a norm 
and a form of Konfliktaufarbeitung. Till today 41 truth commissions have been 
brought to life in order to give victims a voice, and safe their testimony from 
forgetting. Taking the example of Morocco since 2000, this article argues that 
one of the common heritage features around the Mediterranean pertains this 
modern memory culture. In Morocco, the EU for the first time co-financed a 
reconciliation process outside of a European country. 
Since the death of Hassan II in 1999, the public shows an immense interest in 
investigating their own past. Subsequent to the media interest in past crimes, a 
substantial number of (auto-)biographies about Morocco’s Years of Lead (1956 
– 1999) and a revitalization of the human rights’ NGOs (like a Forum Verité et 
Justice), the state felt compelled to react: In 2004, after being pressured for 
many years by victims of political oppression and arbitrary injustices, Moham-
med VI proclaimed the establishing of the “Equity and Reconciliation Instance 
– A National Commission on Truth, Equity and Reconciliation” (abbreviation: 
ERC) to investigate human rights abuses between 1956 – 1999. This is the long-
est timespan for a truth commission to cover. 
The ERC mandate was:  
-to resolve serious human rights abuses, including those disappeared by force 
-establish the level of damages or compensation claimed by victims and their 
families,  
-and to prepare suggestions for reform to prevent such abuses occurring in the 
future. 
The areas of responsibility of the ERC were enforced disappearances and arbi-
trary detention, but did not include criminal prosecution against any perpetra-
tors. AT the same time no amnesty law has been promulgated.  
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The late human rights activist Driss Benzekri (and himself a former political 
prisoner) was nominated for president of the ERC. Around 22,000 victims and 
their families lodged claims with the ERC in 2004. Almost 10,000 of these were 
eventually approved; 742 cases of disappeared people were solved. The claim-
ants received various forms of compensation, including medical assistance, fi-
nancial reparation, and occupational rehabilitation. A total of US$ 85 million 
was paid out in the framework of the ERC in addition to US$ 100 million that 
had been paid out by a former Independent Arbitration Commission: "Many 
Moroccans had refused the first 1999 commission because it awarded money 
solely for torture and disappearance at their own government’s hands. For the 
subsequent 2004-5 ERC awards, more were willing to file due to the commis-
sion’s promise to go beyond mere financial indemnities and encompass collec-
tive reparations directed at regions targeted for de-development." (Slyomovics 
2016: 14, 15) 
The eventual establishment of a truth commission needs to be read as a strategic 
decision by the Moroccan monarchy in order to build-up legitimacy by investi-
gating the past. At the same time it carried (and its follow-up bodies still carry) 
the claim on how to live together in the future? In this sense the ERC is a long-
needed space where memory is mutualized. Here, according to the German po-
litical scientist Helmut König, “the foundations of the political order assume 
tangible form. Which historical events fill us with horror, and which events do 
we recognise as having been central ones, and for what reasons is this the case?” 
(König 2010: 119).  
Mixed reception 
Opinion on the results of the ERC is very divided. Because the perpetrators were 
not brought to justice and there has been no explicit public official apology, 
some consider the ERC to have been a farce.  One would also need to recognize 
that whatever reparation programs have been carried out, understandably they 
will not suffice. Though initiatives like the ERC and the recognition by society 
are important for victims individually - as for society as a whole - victims will 
not stop looking for explanations and they will not stop wanting answers from 
perpetrators and the state. 
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In the view of some parts of the victims, the ERC has reduced the issue of their 
suffering to one of material compensation and has driven it out of public con-
cern ever since. The ERC has in their eyes rather been a mechanism for the co-
optation of a huge number of human rights activists and former political pris-
oners. For others, despite official statements to the contrary, in setting up the 
commission the monarchy has acknowledged its actions, and – far more im-
portantly – has rehabilitated the victims before society. For the first time, a state 
body looked into the torture centres around the country, the attacks by the secu-
rity forces, the blatant perversion of justice and the disappeared, all of which 
were repeatedly and explicitly denied under Hassan II. The ERC also opened 
up the possibility for victims of other injustices to speak out, as we will see 
below. 
The ERC published its findings and recommendations in a 5-volume report in 
2006. Along with safeguarding human rights in constitutional law, the final re-
port called for the ratification and enforcement of international conventions, the 
independence of the judiciary, a reform of penal law, human rights education in 
schools, and a collective reparations program. Since its beginning in 2004, the 
ERC has actively involved historians in its work, and historians have accompa-
nied the ERC in various work groups and publications. Ibrahim Boutaleb, re-
nowned scholar and emeritus professor of contemporary history, was one of the 
sixteen members of the truth commission itself. Younger historians took part in 
classifying the files and organizing the ERC archive and can bring this 
knowledge back into their teaching and research.  
The recommendations have led to two follow-up processes under the auspices 
of the Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme (CNDH) called: ERC 1 “Col-
lective reparations”, and ERC 2 “Archives, History and Memory”. ERC 1, the 
Collective or Communal Compensation Program, constitutes a far-reaching 
principle of justice and equity, reverting back to international norms of transi-
tional justice. In Morocco, they address those districts and regions that were 
harmed by grave and systematic violations (the Western Sahara is excluded 
though). In contrast, the second basket, Archives, History and Memory, was 
established to encourage and facilitate open scientific research on Morocco’s 
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post-colonial history. ERC 2 inter alia covered the creation of three local mu-
seums (Musée du Rif, Musée des Oasis, Musée de la Sahara), the set-up of an 
adequate academic infrastructure, the founding of an institute for contemporary 
history, as well as the introduction of a master degree in contemporary history 
and a subsequent Ph.D. program. 
The truth commission with its various direct and indirect effects was the begin-
ning of a wider awareness of past human rights abuses beyond the direct victims 
and their families. Their public rehabilitation in the eyes of neighbours, former 
friends, and society as whole is a very important result of the ERC. An official 
rehabilitation - and here the state is important - created an essential form of 
social viability, because it addressed the possibility to live side by side with the 
perpetrators - a question that poses itself all over the Middle East and North 
Africa now.  
Some families changed their names after having faced this arbitrary and incom-
prehensible act of loss, in order to safeguard their children. Parents who wait 
for their children or spouses who continue waiting for their partners even after 
20 or 25 years feel guilty abandoning this state of waiting, not to mention claim-
ing inheritance or a pension. The remaining children all too often grow up in 
the shadow of the absent child; others feel like “replacement childs”. Their suf-
fering became part of a wider social memory, as the doyen of history in Mo-
rocco, Mohammed Kenbib, puts it: “Those who tell their ordeal and the suffer-
ings of their close friends no longer remain an isolated voice but become part 
of a much wider field and in a certain way the expression of rights violations 
and collective affliction the whole nation is concerned with.” (Kenbib 2009: 56) 
Conclusion 
Under pressure by the victims' narratives emanating since the early 1990s, the 
Moroccan state became both: a provider of one platform among others which 
intensified the societal debate beyond a confined circle of those concerned and 
those interested, and a controller of the debate that could oversee the process 
through its manifold initiatives. By giving the CNDH constitutional status with 
the constitutional reform in 2011, the state supposedly places great importance 
on the follow-up process after the ERC. This space is needed for the circulation 
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of competing narratives – a process of transforming memory into history -, oth-
erwise the five-volume recommendations edited by Driss Benzekri only shortly 
before his death with no inner restriction would have been buried in the drawer. 
Still, the state certainly does not have a monopoly on the production of historical 
knowledge nor the reconfiguration of the past into the present. 
Achieving a common understanding of one’s own history is always the subject 
of bitter controversy. Morocco is a rare case in the Arab world, where the silence 
of the victims has been broken and where the historians – first journalists, then 
academics - are critically reviewing their own silence. The silence of the ar-
chives might be shattered in the near future. But the silence of the perpetrators 
is well kept. Morocco is witnessing the public exchange of personal experiences 
over human rights violations in numerous communication channels. I argue that 
although “voicing” partly works towards turning the page, i.e. we forget what 
we exclaimed, its transformative capacities have been more influential than its 
suppressive ones. Over the last 25 years, personal memories developed into a 
“form of activism to denounce past and present state violence” (Menin forth-
coming). The circulation of memory puts cracks into the quiescence and pushed 
a debate on the past. Critical revision of the past is still difficult as sources are 
hard to access and authors have to anticipate obstruction at any time. But aca-
demics and journalists have begun to voice conflicting histories by venturing in 
hitherto “Forbidden Places”, thus the title of a documentary about the ERC’s 
workings by Leila Kilani.   
Old bonds have surely not vanished in Morocco yet but a revision can be seen 
already turning former heroes into villains and former traitors into heroes. Driss 
Yazami, the current president of the CNDH – one of the major motors behind 
this re-writing - talks very prudently about an “inflation of memory” vs. a deficit 
of history and sees its remedy in academic rigidity: “We discover, and the Mo-
roccan society with us, that maybe we suffer of something that we could call an 
inflation of memories and a deficit of history and the accomplished action ne-
cessitates a follow up with the weapons of academic rigidity. And it is for this 
reason that the [truth] commission issued multiple recommendations in favor of 
a modern conduct of archives, a continuous effort of academic formation and 
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endorsement of research, as well as subsequently a popularization through the 
creation of museums.” (Libération 10.12.2013) 
Though not always directly related to history, my argument is to say that the 
public space to discuss abuses by the state power has widened in the context of 
a review of the reign by the former king. In the praxis of attributing such a cen-
tral part to the past ruled over by Hassan II, citizens are carrying out an “au-
topsy” (Jamaa Baida, today director of the new Archives du Maroc) of his reign 
as a day-to-day praxis. The repetitive downward readings of a heroic post-colo-
nial past, their obvious white spots and the uprisings against state authority to-
day are in my view intrinsically linked. 
The pluralisation of national history writing has advanced over the last 15 years. 
Over time, journalists and historians alike have established themselves as im-
portant players, and their alternative readings of the past have started to cast 
doubt on long-established official narratives. Telling – be it in the fields of art, 
media or humanities – has become an act of moral significance: thus its strong 
normative core and its connection to present ideas about society. Academics 
like Nadia Guessous, Jillali el-Adnani, Hakim Belabbès, Abdellah Tourabi and 
others have taken up this impetus with the explicit aim of bringing back voices 
subdued in the past. As Susan Slyomovics makes clear: “What was new in Mo-
roccan history became the individual act of making an official written and reg-
istered claim against the state for money and restitution. This in turn produced 
a file filled with documents based on a written record of the interview and oral 
testimony with the victim. In sum, the ERC project to provide reparations for 
illegal imprisonment and forced disappearance remains the motivating force for 
the creation of the ERC archive. Drawn from oral testimonies in several public 
sessions throughout the country, during private group presentations and indi-
vidual interviews at commission headquarters in Rabat, the voices of witnesses 
and victims constitute that archive. Moroccans, who are the subject of the record 
as witnesses and victims, were the primary co-creators of the record." 
(Slyomovics 2016: 18) 
Individual memories have acquired transformative qualities as they uncover 
hidden histories and subvert official readings of 20th century Moroccan history. 
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It is this relatively longue durée over the past 25 years which needs to be taken 
into account when studying Morocco’s societal dialogue over conflict and com-
peting readings of the past. Beyond efforts to control a critical discourse and its 
protagonists, this work shows how an official acknowledgement of past human 
rights abuses leads to a widening of the debate, and thereby to an incalculable 
liberalization of the public sphere: A more general debate about legitimate and 
illegitimate violence emerges, and affects the relationships of power within Mo-
roccan society. Hitherto unknown cases of state offences and misconduct have 
been subjected to public scrutiny challenging Morocco’s politically relevant 
elite, including the king himself. As a synthesis, this revision can be traced in 
an emerging “New Historiography” exemplified in selected changing grand nar-
ratives on Morocco’s nationalist movement, post-colonial uprisings and oppo-
sition, racism and violence. 
Mediated through the ERC, personal memories initiated such changes and laid 
the ground for a more open and free investigation of the past. The opening of 
the Archives du Maroc and the Institut du Temps, the three regional museums 
under way or the envisaged Maison de l’Histoire du Maroc are thus not only 
complicated infrastructural matters but the basis for free academic and public 
discourse. Many citizens in the Middle East express deep discomfort about a 
post-colonial past that is regarded as their prime reference, but which they feel 
is completely unrevealed to them. Thus, I think, we can say: the way people live 
with history is currently changing drastically. 
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ONE Heritage –  
Heritage and Society in the Euro-Mediterranean Community  
By Rupert Graf Strachwitz 
Why should the Maecenata Foundation, a pro-active German civil society think 
tank, organize a side-event to the European Cultural Heritage Summit?  
The reason is that since 2012, one of the foundation’s programmes has been 
‘Europe Bottom-Up’, and that ‘Europe and the Mediterranean’ is the most im-
portant project within this programme. The foundation has organized interna-
tional conferences in Italy (in 2013 and 2015) and in Greece (in 2017) that fo-
cussed on ‘Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together’ and brought to-
gether delegates of all ages from academia, cultural institutions, and civil soci-
ety and from countries all around the Mediterranean. The title chosen for the 
2017 conference was ‘Remember for the Future – The Mediterranean As a 
Memory Space’. The cultural heritage Europe shares with all who live around 
the Mediterranean played a prominent role in the discussions, not least because 
Europa Nostra Vice President Costa Carras and others devoted their presenta-
tions to some particularly relevant and frequently overlooked aspects of this 
vital precondition of rebuilding trust and thus reconstructing the common space, 
as soon as politics permit civil society to do so29. 
 
                                                          
29 The proceeds of the ‚Europe and the Mediterranean’ conferences held in 2013, 2015, and 2017 are pub-
lished in the Maecenata Foundation’s Europe Bottom Up online publication series as follows: 
Udo Steinbach, Rupert Graf Strachwitz, Piero Antonio Rumignani (Eds.) Europe and the Mediterranean. 
Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together 1. EBU No. 11: 2015, Udo Steinbach, Rupert Graf 
Strachwitz, Piero Antonio Rumignani (Eds.) Europe and the Mediterranean. Talking, Learning, Working, 
and Living Together 2. EBU No. 12: 2015, Costa Carras, Sarrah Kassem, Udo Steinbach Europe and the 
Mediterranean. Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Toether 3. EBU No. 17: 2017, P. Adam-Veleni, M. 
Çizakça, V. Costantini, U. Koldaş, F. Richard, B. Thum Europe and the Mediterranean. Talking, Learning, 
Working, and Living Together 4. EBU No. 18: 2017, Y. Bettahar, S. Hamouda, E. Ikonomou, N. Lafi, D. 
Stefanakis Europe and the Mediterranean. Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together 5. EBU No. 
19: 2017 
see: http://web.maecenata.eu/publikationen-europa/europa-bottom-up  
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Hence, it appeared relevant to introduce the findings into the debates of the Eu-
ropean Cultural Heritage Summit.  
What is it that drives us to do so? 
 „In countries that lack a fully representative democratic government, civil so-
ciety is often the only vehicle through which to vocalise – on behalf of the men, 
women, and children of all the religious or ethnic groupings – the most effective 
and constructive way to develop and implement a lasting peace in their soci-
ety.“30 It may well be that this task for civil society applies as much to countries 
that do enjoy some form of representative government. Most certainly it applies 
a wide range of tasks and challenges facing the citizens today, not least the 
guardianship for our cultural heritage, which is after all one of the prime cata-
lysts of identity and loyalty. Moreover, this cultural heritage is ONE, and is 
common to the people of Europe and the MENA region. 
West Germany’s first post-War Head of State, Theodor Heuss is quoted as say-
ing: “There are three hills, from which the Western world originated: Golgotha, 
the Athenian Acropolis, and the Capitol in Rome. From all of them, the Western 
world was moulded, one has to see them in unity.”31 One is reminded of this 
when hearing what some people utter as they talk about the MENA region, the 
south side of Mediterranean, often in fact including part of the north side as well 
– anything south of the Alps. What some politicians are telling us creates an 
artificial divide between the North and the South. Our common cultural heritage 
presents an appropriate and compelling argument against these kind of opinions. 
It is for this reason we felt that in the context of a European Cultural Heritage 
Summit, we should remind ourselves that to understand Europe’s cultural her-
itage is not possible without looking across the Mediterranean. 
                                                          
30 Mark Muller Stuart, Storm in the Desert. Britain’s Intervention in Libya and the Arab Spring. Edinburgh: 
Birlinn, 2017, p. 167 
31 „"Es gibt drei Hügel, von denen das Abendland seinen Ausgang genommen hat: Golgatha, die Akropolis 
in Athen, das Capitol in Rom. Aus allen ist das Abendland geistig gewirkt, und man darf alle drei, man muss 
sie als Einheit sehen." Theodor Heuss, speaking at the opening of a school in 1950, quoted from: Theodor 
Heuss, Reden an die Jugend, Tübingen 1956, p. 32 (translation by the author). 
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After all: Roman Law was codified by Justinian, who was born in Macedonia, 
and ruled in Constantinople as Emperor for 38 years in the 6th century). Justin-
ian’s Code remains the basis of European, including Scottish, and Muslim law. 
The commonalities of foundation law that regulates one of the earliest and most 
persistent cultural achievements of mankind, are just one example. 
Greek philosophy, the basis of our thought, and indeed our religion, was trans-
lated into Arabic, and then retranslated into Latin. Without these translations, 
much of Plato and particularly Aristotle would be lost, since the barbarians from 
the north destroyed most libraries. 
Christian religion was developed at the very South Eastern corner of the Medi-
terranean. From all we know or may assume Jesus was not a mere wandering 
Holy Man in an rural far-away part of the Roman Empire. He grew up on the 
outskirts of a new capital, Sepphoris, and must have spent many years studying 
and imbuing Jewish, Greek, Egyptian and most probably Zoroastrian and Bud-
dhist philosophy. Interestingly, a brief survey of aprrox. 50 cathedrals and major 
churches in Germany has shown that their patron saints nearly always came 
from today’s Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey – most prominently 
Mary, Peter, and Nicholas (who lived in the 3rd century in Myra/Turkey). There 
is not a single German among them, which just shows that in looking at tradi-
tions the right way, we only have to go back a little further to discover this one 
common heritage. To think Europe without the entire Mediterranean is, so we 
may conclude, impossible. 
As long as the Roman Empire lasted, this was obvious. It was mare nostrum – 
a political unity, that existed from the 1st century B.C. to the 4th century AD. 
Before that and after that, the region was – and still is – politically fragmented 
and has undergone continual changes. But trade, ideas, styles, way of life, and 
art travelled freely across the sea, as did ideas, people, and goods. Phoenicians, 
Egyptians, Greeks, Celts, Romans, Jews, Visigoths and Ostrogoths, Arabs, Nor-
mans, French, Venetians, Genoese, Turks, and finally the British, not to mention 
many others fought to be masters of the sea – and failed. There were times when 
Northern Europe was the Master of the Mediterranean – be it the Byzantine 
Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, the Realms of Jerusalem. There were others 
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when the Arabs, and later the Turks commanded the sea. All this, regretfully, 
was not always peaceful – conquerors of all types, pirates, and what today would 
be termed terrorists presented a real danger. But traffic and intercultural ex-
change never stopped. 
Finally, in the 19th and 20th century, when Turkey had become the “sick old man 
of Europe”, European powers tried to carve up the Mediterranean. Germany, 
although busy constructing the Baghdad Railway, could never quite make up 
her mind whether she should be part of this or not, and ended up forming an 
alliance with Turkey against France, Britain, and Russia in the 1st World War. 
European imperialism culminated in Sir Mark Sykes and François-Georges Pi-
cot drawing a line through territory that was not part of either of their countries 
to determine their respective interest zones. What drove them, and how they 
thought, becomes clear from a quotation attributed to Mark Sykes: „I feel such 
an intense prejudice against Armenians that I am certain that anything I might 
say would only be biased and therefore not worth reading; and I think anyone 
who has had dealings of any kind with this abominable race would probably be 
in the same position. The Armenian inspires one with feelings of contempt and 
hatred which the most unprejudiced would find it hard to crush. His cowardice, 
his senseless untruthfulness, the depth of his intrigue, even in the most trivial 
matters, his habit of hoarding, his lack of one manly virtue, his helplessness in 
danger, his natural and instinctive treachery, together form so vile a character 
that pity is stifled and judgment unbalanced. I cannot believe, as some urge, that 
his despicable personality has been produced merely by Turkish tyranny.“ 
So, given this track record, what is our task? 
A telling phrase is attributed to Sir Thomas More, Benjamin Franklin, and Gus-
tav Mahler: “Tradition is keeping the fire burning, not praising the ashes!” Who-
ever said it first, does not matter very much. It tells us that we need to rethink 
our concept of heritage in a forward-looking, post-colonial spirit. Europe and 
the Mediterranean belong together. In the 21st century global village, when at-
tempting to find common ground with all men and women who inhabit this 
planet, what could be more appropriate than to find a common cultural ground 
with those among our neighbours whom we share so much with anyway. Our 
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previous conferences have learnt us the lesson that talking becomes easy when 
being respectful rather than overbearing or arrogant, and concentrating on com-
monalities rather than divides. There is some evidence that civil society is better 
at this than governments. Most certainly, our previous experiences have demon-
strated very clearly that there is ample common ground for citizens from differ-
ent walks of life to explore. This is the experience we felt we should bring to 
the table at the 2018 European Cultural Heritage Summit. 
We are grateful to Europa Nostra and the German National Committee for Cul-
tural Heritage for allowing us to do this side event. We are indebted to the Rep-
resentation of the Free State of Bavaria in Berlin for offering us their beautiful 
venue, and extremely pleased that such a distinguished group of experts assem-
bled to discuss the issues. 
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